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NEATNESS DOESN’T COUNT

Donald Chisholm

Williams, Cindy, ed. Filling the Ranks: Transforming the U.S.
Military System. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2004. 376pp. $50
Cold steel isn’t worth a damn in an emergency. You need men to direct it.
FREDERICK BRITTEN, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 15 MAY 1934

The road to hell is paved with good intentions.
MARY KATHERINE CHISHOLM (VARIOUS DATES)

To date, transformation debates have ranged widely over force structures, command and control, networked warfare, rapid decisive operations, and their associated processes and technologies, not to mention privatization. It remains
personnel, however, that give life and shape to organizations, and there is precious little informed discussion of the critical problems of military personnel in
the contemporary setting. As part of a fine MIT publication series on national
security issues, Filling the Ranks might have done much to overcome that lacuna,
but unfortunately, it falls short in several respects; to follow its well-intentioned
policy recommendations would produce serious harm to a system that, judged
by its accomplishments, is already extraordinarily effective.
Filling the Ranks comprises twelve essays by different authors (two-thirds are
economists, several having political science or government backgrounds, with
one each from mathematics and business administration, and only a couple
with professional military experience), framed by introductory and concluding
chapters by its editor. Its self-proclaimed mission is to present “assessments of
U.S. military pay and personnel policies in light of the strategic, demographic,
economic, and labor realities of the future. It identiDr. Chisholm is a professor in the Joint Military Operafies specific problems that today’s military career pattions Department of the U.S. Naval War College. He
terns, training, pay, and benefits pose for officers and
earned his PhD in political science from the University
of California, Berkeley. His book Waiting for Dead
enlisted men and women in both active duty and reMen’s Shoes: Origins and Development of the U.S.
serve forces, discussing such issues as competition with
Navy’s Officer Personnel System, 1793–1941 (Palo
the private sector for talent, the need to restructure
Alto, Calif.: Stanford Univ. Press, 2001) received the
2001 Rear Admiral Samuel Eliot Morison Award for
compensation, and provision of family support. It ofDistinguished Contribution to Naval Literature.
fers recommendations for more flexible, adaptive, and
1
effective policies and a blueprint for achieving them.”
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This reviewer offers a dissenting perspective. In so doing, I restrict my attention
to two principal problems of the work, constraints of space precluding both
wider-ranging evaluation and differentiated attention to its individual essays.
WHERE IS “SERVICE”?
This book’s component essays focus almost exclusively on manipulating “tangible inducements” to produce desired results. Frederick Winslow Taylor famously believed that people were at once inherently lazy and sorely greedy for
material goods.2 To overcome the former in the manufactory setting, to ensure
that workers would not “soldier,” Taylor disdained hourly or salaried pay and devised a system of compensation directly tying individual pay to individual
productivity—the so-called piece-rate system, which was, in turn, contrived by
means of an empirical analysis of work processes. Scientific management would
thus improve productivity and eliminate the principal impetus for managementlabor discord by irrefutably establishing those production levels that were actually possible—management could not then ask for more, and workers could not
then perform less. Indeed, Taylor and his acolytes did bring a certain order to the
3
workplace and improved the efficiency of large industrial enterprises.
Within less than two decades of Taylorism’s acme, however, pioneering empirical studies by other students of organization and management, notably F. J.
Roethlisberger, demonstrated that organization of work processes and production levels, far from being determined by scientific analysis and implemented by
management, were largely set and enforced through a complex informal social
4
organization of the workers.
Shortly thereafter, a vastly experienced corporate executive, in residence for a
time at Harvard, observed that all organizations employ complex economies of
incentives to attract and retain workers and to secure from them the necessary
5
services. Chester I. Barnard concluded that although an objective economy of
incentives (pay and other material emoluments) was essential, no organization
ever possessed sufficient resources to secure required contributions solely by objective means. Consequently, all organizations also employed subjective economies of incentives appealing to other than purely material motivations (working
conditions, symbolic rewards, socialization to organizational values, and the
like), both as a matter of constrained resources and as practical recognition of
powerful human motivations that could be effectively manipulated by organizations for their own purposes.
It is mildly astonishing, therefore, that any serious discussion of military personnel “transformation” could be undertaken absent systematic consideration
of the subjective economy of incentives. Nonetheless, Taylor’s dogma, however
discredited, apparently constituted the alpha and omega of individual human
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol59/iss2/12
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motivation for the authors of this collection of essays. They seek to manipulate
those aspects susceptible of manipulation and measurement, irrespective of their
6
practical relevance to the problems at hand. Even this assumption is suspect—
efforts to structure naval officers’ pay to encourage willingness to go to sea began
in the early nineteenth century, meeting with only partial success. Tying promotion to sea duty performed proved far more effective as an incentive. Moreover,
if the precise amounts of pay, allowances, incentives, and benefits actually received by service members remain somewhat opaque and difficult to sum, it is
7
likely because such opacity serves a function in the larger polity.
The military’s commissioned officer corps developed as a distinct profession
very early in its history, with internally derived performance standards and en8
forcement. For officers, and now increasingly senior enlisted personnel as well,
the subjective economy of incentives has elaborated to an effective complex of
mechanisms: the intrinsic value of service to and sacrifice for country; opportunity for promotion through the grades; assignment to duty in which service
members can actively practice their profession, carry responsibility, and exercise
discretion, to include, ultimately, command; overseas travel and residence; access to training and educational opportunities; decorations for valor and extraordinary accomplishment; and opportunity to join a tradition of excellence and
achievement. Everyone has to pay the rent, but professional officers have always
been more highly motivated by the subjective economy of incentives than their
civilian counterparts, now made easier by very decent pay, the best retirement
program bar none, and other benefits. For good reason, service in the military
has been a calling sometimes likened to life in a monastery.
FALSE ECONOMY
There is another, troubling myopia common to these essays. In devising their
personnel systems, all organizations must attend to both economy—that is,
cost—and equity for individual members. First and foremost, however, we need
9
our organizations to be effective and reliable. We create and maintain public organizations to provide vital goods and services—external security primary
among them—that the market is unwilling or unable to provide reliably in desired ways at appropriate levels, often because they cannot be generated at a
profit; that is, they are inherently inefficient. It is a perilous misdirection to be
efficiently ineffective, but especially so for public organizations, which need to
be assessed for accomplishment far more than cost. In fact, in the face of the uncertainty and danger characteristic of turbulent environments, hard experience
shows us that effectiveness and reliability are rarely achieved absent organizational redundancy, even though this runs precisely opposite to the efficiency as10
sumptions and theorems of theoretical economics.
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2006
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In the military context, effectiveness translates to war-fighting ability. One
searches in vain, however, for close attention to war fighting and military effectiveness by the authors of Filling the Ranks. Rather, consistent with broader efforts to bring the ethos of private business to the military over the past decade or
so, these essays focus on economic efficiency, with attention to equity as it appears to play in incentives for performance. Thus, one learns that because computer specialists are worth more in the private market than they are currently
paid in the military, to improve their retention rates they should be paid more in
equivalent grades than the infantryman whose combat skills find little demand
in the private sector. Aside from its implicit dismissal of the vital importance of
the lowly grunt, especially in counterinsurgency and similar operations, and
bearing in mind the importance of technical knowledge in the modern U.S. military, this recommendation ignores the fact that the military has long provided
social mobility by means of access to stable income, education, and training,
with the expectation that military personnel will move to the private sector—a
historically extraordinary and effective subsidy of industry. Comparisons of the
military services with private labor markets need to be undertaken advisedly and
only with careful qualification. Defense, is, after all, a public good and is likely to
remain so. As General Dwight D. Eisenhower once said to his subordinates:
“Now boys, let’s not make our mistakes in a hurry.”
Few would question that the military personnel system is now under great
stress. Let me suggest, however, that this strain has been produced not by difficulties of the objective economy of incentives to which these essays address
themselves but by the post–Vietnam War shift to an all-volunteer force, the post–
Cold War drawdown in military strength, a world suffused with failing states
and the troubles they breed, unrealistic assumptions about the use of conventional military force to produce desired results in this environment, intentional
Department of Defense policies that for reasons of economy have stripped virtually all slack from the military services, an ongoing real shooting war, and the
resulting sustained high operational tempo (and concomitant personnel
11
tempo) that shows little sign of abating any time soon. Relieving this stress
hinges on addressing the underlying problems described immediately above, the
scope of which vastly exceeds those aspects of the personnel system considered
in Filling the Ranks.
In the end, these essays are not really about personnel reform and combat effectiveness. Rather, they are about two other, lesser objectives: making the system more penetrable and rendering military personnel themselves more
malleable by their civilian masters; and reducing costs. That a personnel system is
cumbersome or difficult to manage presents no justification for reorganization
if it is already effective. Neatness doesn’t count; outcome counts. Institutions
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol59/iss2/12
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cumulate their structures and processes over decades and centuries of trialand-error response to practical problems and, although sometimes appearing
byzantine and arcane, usually have sound reasons for their particular configura12
tion. The track record for sweeping reorganizations remains dismal. These essays display poor historical grasp, suffering from casual, sometimes plain
inaccurate, empirical assertions, combined with an alarming lack of understanding of the military profession and the factors that motivate its members. Finally,
these essays define the problem in terms of a preferred, a priori solution: instead
of working regressively from a carefully structured problem, they begin with a
set of untested assumptions and work forward, leading, fundamentally, to trying
13
to solve the wrong problem. This reviewer does not share the optimism of the
authors of Filling the Ranks; at the macro level, their policy recommendations do
not address the most serious military personnel problems but rather, if followed,
will produce myriad unintended consequences, some of which will be pro14
foundly negative.
The military personnel system can benefit from careful empirical analysis to
produce an accurate image of its problems’ structures, accompanied by a systematic process of generating appropriate alternatives to the status quo, to be treated
as empirically testable hypotheses intended to produce incremental adaptations.
Also, notwithstanding contemporary urges to centralize, consolidate, and standardize (often under the mystical guise of enhanced “jointness”), any analysis
must take account of the fundamentally different histories, missions, and operating environments of the several services. Filling the Ranks does not provide
such an analysis.

NOTES

1. Available at mitpress.mit.edu/catalog/author/
default.asp?aid=192.
2. See Frederick W. Taylor, The Principles of Scientific Management (New York: Harper,
1911; repr. Norton, 1967). See also Judith
Merkle, Management and Ideology: The Legacy of the International Scientific Management
Movement (Berkeley: Univ. of California
Press, 1980). Taylor’s aim was to decompose
given work processes into their smallest components, define the levels and optimum
method for each, train workers to those components, establish normative production levels, and, finally, pay any given worker only
for that level of skill required and for his actual production. This diminished labor’s
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power by making any one worker readily replaceable by any other suitably trained
worker.
3. Scientific management was implemented
over a vast olio of enterprises, including an
ill-fated experiment in Navy-owned shipyards that was quickly abandoned.
4. Along with Elton Mayo, George Homans,
and others, F. J. Roethlisberger conducted the
famous “Hawthorne Studies” over several
years, beginning in the mid-1920s, reported
in Management and Morale (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1941).
5. Chester I. Barnard gave a series of management lectures at Harvard in 1937, published
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as Functions of the Executive (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1938), still in
print in many languages. This reviewer considers it among the several best books on
management ever written. Among his many
accomplishments in both private and public
sectors, Barnard established and ran the
United Services Organization (USO) during
World War II.
6. Elizabeth A. Stanley-Mitchell’s “The Military
Profession and Intangible Rewards for Service,” pp. 93–118, is the sole exception to this
generalization.
7. Congressional efforts to nail down exactly the
pay received by naval officers dates to at least
the mid-nineteenth century. The short-lived
reforms included discontinuance of fuel allowances and rations, with increased pay to
compensate for same. Opacity also helps to
mask the inevitable inequalities and inequities in any system of compensation, thereby
reducing heartburn. See Donald Chisholm,
Waiting for Dead Men’s Shoes: Origins and
Development of the U.S. Navy’s Officer Personnel System, 1793–1941 (Palo Alto, Calif.: Stanford Univ. Press, 2001), chaps. 7–11, 23.
8. See Christopher McKee, A Gentlemanly and
Honorable Profession: The Creation of the U.S.
Naval Officer Corps, 1794–1815 (Annapolis,
Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1991); Peter
Karsten, The Naval Aristocracy: The Golden
Age of Annapolis and the Emergence of
Navalism (New York: Free Press, 1972); and
Chisholm, Waiting for Dead Men’s Shoes.
9. See Chisholm, Waiting for Dead Men’s Shoes,
chap. 1.
10. See Martin Landau, “Redundancy, Reliability,
and the Problem of Duplication and Overlap,”
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Public Administration Review 29 (1972), pp.
346–58.
11. The military faces well documented recruitment and retention problems, which the reviewer believes resulted primarily from a
post–Cold War military that was structured
and sized to fight conventional conflicts of
the preferred American type but that now is
and will be called upon for the foreseeable future to fight low-intensity conflicts that are
enormously consumptive of personnel over
long periods of time.
12. Abysmally unsuccessful Western efforts to
“develop” third world countries by means of
large-scale projects that ignore local history
and institutions are instructive on this point.
See, for example, J. Stephen Lansing, “Balinese ‘Water Temples’ and the Management
of Irrigation,” American Anthropologist 89
(1987), pp. 326–41.
13. Economists have largely remained indifferent
to the practical problems of searching for and
generating alternatives because it assumes
that the market will present alternatives to
the decision maker. Notable exceptions include Wesley C. Mitchell and Herbert A.
Simon.
14. See Robert K. Merton, “The Unanticipated
Consequences of Social Action,” American
Sociological Review 1(1936), pp. 894–904. Unintended and unanticipated consequences are
not the same as the economist’s “negative externalities,” about which, by definition, the
individual decision maker, the firm, does not
care. Responsible public policy makers, in
contrast, must be concerned with unanticipated consequences.
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